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The Supreme Court‘s five to four decision applying the Second
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment has
produced paradoxical reactions.1 The New York Times calls the ruling
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1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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―an enormous symbolic victory for supporters of gun rights‖ and the
Washington Post says it may be ―more symbolic than substantive.‖2
On the one hand, it is the first time the Court has enforced a new
provision of the Bill of Rights against the states in forty years.3 On the
balance scale between the views of Justice Black and those of Justice
Frankfurter, it puts another weight on Black‘s side of the scales.4
On the other hand, it has been observed that McDonald ―did come
out . . . as predicted . . . .‖5 As I have observed before,6 McDonald’s end

2. Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Extends Second Amendment to the States, Casts
Doubt on Chicago Handgun Ban, ABA JOURNAL (June 28, 2010, 9:14 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_extends_second_amendment_to_the_
states/. Douglas Berman wrote in a blog for Sentencing Law and Policy that McDonald v. Chicago
was ―as big as it gets.‖ A Gun Case or Pandora’s Box?: Ruling Could Trigger the Unhinging of
American
Culture,
(Dec.
11,
2009),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/12/a-gun-case-or-pandoras-boxruling-could-trigger-the-unhinging-of-american-culture.html (citing A gun case or Pandora’s box?,
WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/11/agun-case-or-pandoras-box-55900250/.
3. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (no double jeopardy).
4. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and id. at
68 (Black, J. dissenting). .
5. Michael Dreeben, Supreme Court Review, THE NAT‘L L.J. 22 (Aug. 2, 2010). See also,
Scott Piepho, Privileges and Immunities in McDonald v. Chicago, AKRON LEGAL NEWS 1 (July 21,
2010) (―The decision itself seemed pretty much fore-ordained . . . .‖) and Pat Oliphant, Editorial,
Closing Arguments, AKRON BEACON J., June 30, 2010, at A6 (―The ruling hardly surprises,
following the logic of the earlier decision.‖). While some believed that McDonald might be the
―blockbuster‖ of the 2009 Term, in retrospect, it was argued that the Court‘s decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), ―dominated the term.‖ See Sri
Srinivasan, Supreme Court Review, supra. In a review of the whole term, Law Week concluded that
Citizens United and McDonald v. Chicago ―hogg[ed] the term.‖ 79 U.S.L.W. 3033 (July 2010).
Randy Barnett indicated that ―most . . . observers believed [McDonald] would succeed‖ in his
challenge against the Chicago statutes. Randy Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the
Challenge to Economic Mandates, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 2:11 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/10/17/the-differences-between-mcdonald-and-the-challenge-to-economicmandates [hereinafter Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the Challenge to Economic
Mandates]. Certainly, it was a ―landmark ruling.‖ David M. O‘Brien, SUPREME COURT WATCH
2010: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2007, 2008, AND 2009 TERMS AND PREVIEW OF THE 2010 TERM, 77
(2011). Of course it was not always so. Besides opposition from Justice Frankfurter and his
acolytes, some prominent scholars thought that intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to the
contrary. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed By Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of
Originalism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 167, 169 & 194 n.8 (2000) (―Regardless of how the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to bear arms, it seems doubtful that it should apply to
the states.‖).
6. Richard Aynes, McDonald v. Chicago: The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?, SCOTUS
BLOG (June 29, 2010, 2:19 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-v-chicago-theblockbuster-of-the-2009-term/, and cross-posted at AKRON LAW CAFÉ BLOG (July 1, 2010),
http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/akron_law_cafe/2010/07/mcdonald-v-chicago-the-blockbusterof-the-2009-term/ [hereinafter Aynes, The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?]. The history of the
Second Amendment is less than clear. At common law and since at least the Assize of Arms
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result merely reigns in the City of Chicago as a renegade and outlier,7
just as Heller reined in the renegade and outlier Washington, D.C.8 To
the extent we can judge the effect of Heller and McDonald, they are
consistent with all fifty states‘ constitutional provisions and most of the
existing state laws.9 Furthermore, they are consistent with what polls
tell us is the view of the American people: some people should have the
right to have guns, but there should be limitations.10 Moreover, David
Koppel reports that ―[i]n every state where the people have had the
opportunity to vote directly, they have endorsed the right to arms by
landslide margins.‖11
Alan Gura, the attorney who successfully argued both Heller and
McDonald, surely has ―it right‖ when he implicitly declared victory (it
was a victory—he won both cases) and put the decision in a positive
light:
Critically, Justice Thomas‘s [concurring] opinion provides an excellent
platform for restoring the Fourteenth Amendment‘s original public
meaning. That today‘s result has a strong historical basis may have
increased the plurality‘s comfort level in utilizing substantive due
process, but Justice Thomas demonstrated that concern for the
constitutional text‘s original public meaning was actually necessary to
achieve the result. In 1868, the public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause commanded the

(1181), all men of the tithing were required to have and to bear arms to respond to the ―hue and
cry.‖ JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 27 (2009). On the other hand, the lack of personal weapons by private individuals was
exemplified by the fact that during Confederate General John Hunt Morgan‘s raid through Indiana
and Ohio, while many men showed up to defend those states with their own weapons, others said to
be in the militia were not able to be used because of a lack of arms. A COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF
THE JOHN MORGAN RAID THROUGH KENTUCKY, INDIANA AND OHIO, IN JULY 1803 26 (n.p., Flora
E. Simmons, publisher 1868) (several hundred militiamen were ―on hand, but without arms . . . .‖).
At the same time, at common law, both tort and criminal law recognize the right of an individual to
act in self-defense, with or without arms.
7. The only known cities to have the type of restrictive gun law that existed in Chicago and
Washington, D.C., beside those two cities, are five Chicago suburbs. KOPEL, infra note 8, at 132.
8. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 99, 122 (2010).
9. What Professor Adam Winkler wrote of Heller is equally applicable to McDonald.
Dennis A. Henigan, Book Review, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 332 (2010) (reviewing MARK V.
TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN‘T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007)
(―[T]he Heller case is a landmark decision that has not changed very much at all.‖)).
10. Kopel, supra note 8, at 117 n.68.
11. Id. at 122.
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support of a ratifying nation. After today, no one should doubt that it
will yet command a majority of the Supreme Court. 12

I. CHANGES
Though I am suggesting the changes will be small, there will be
changes.13 Both Heller and McDonald have demonstrated to all that the
political leaders of states and the District of Columbia do not have
―unfettered‖ leave to restrict the ownership of guns any more than they
have ―unfettered‖ leave to restrict the right of free speech. There are
limits and people drafting legislation to regulate gun ownership will
have to follow those limitations.
McDonald affects not just the Chicago case, but also others that
were pending at the time. One of the most prominent of these is the
Ninth Circuit case in Nordyke v. King,14 where the court held the
Fourteen Amendment, through its Due Process Clause, required the
enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states; but in that
particular case the county ordinance did not violate those rights. The
panel opinion in Nordyke was vacated and remanded for reconsideration
by the trial court in view of McDonald.15
II. JUSTICE ALITO‘S OPINION
In many ways, the majority opinion authored by Justice Alito is a
very modest one. The Brief of the Respondent NRA16 was powerful in
outlining the way in which Heller foreshadowed the result to be taken in
McDonald.17 Indeed, even though some complained that McDonald had

12. Alan Gura, McDonald—A Victory for the Second Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (June 29,
2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-a-victory-for-the-the-secondamendment/.
13. David Cohen and Maxwell Stearns have indicated that Heller and McDonald ―will
dramatically alter legal policy in vital urban centers.‖ David S. Cohen & Maxwell Stearns,
McDonald Typifies Need for Consensus, THE NAT‘L L.J. 35 (July 12, 2010)
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463394661&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1
(emphasis added). But see supra notes 5, 6, 12 & 15 for a contrary view as to its effects upon the
nation as a whole.
14. 563 F. 3rd 439 (9th Cir. 2010) (judgment vacated). See also Maloney v. Ricea, 5545 F.
3d 56, 77 U.S.L.W. 1473(2d Cir. 2009) (judgment vacated).
15. Nordyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
16. Under Supreme Court of the United States Rule 12, the NRA, a party below whose
petition for certiorari was not granted, was treated as a respondent. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.
17. Even historian Saul Cornell, who opposed both Heller and McDonald, concluded ―even
if‖ Chicago‘s ordinance were to be declared unconstitutional, ―nothing else will likely change.‖
Saul Cornell, A Possible Win for both Sides (Mar. 2, 2010, 7:17 PM)
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/states-rights-vs-gun-rights/?hp.

AYNES_CONLAW_6.21.11_FINAL FOR WEBSITE

2011]

MCDONALD V. CHICAGO

6/21/2011 6:17 PM

185

a surprising result,18 Justice Alito‘s opinion states that on the question of
enforcing the Second Amendment against the states, ―our decision in
Heller points unmistakably to the answer.‖19
One part of the conservatism of the opinion is utilizing the Due
Process Clause rather than the more historically accurate Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Though, personally, I would have preferred Justice
Thomas‘s ―more straightforward path,‖20 one can understand a desire to
use established approaches. As Justice Scalia said, in addressing a
slightly different aspect of the case: ―This case does not require me to
consider [his misgivings over the concept of substantive due process],
since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide
it.‖21 Justice Thomas made the same point in his concurring opinion.
The plurality opinion by Justice Alito used ―what is now a well-settled
test . . .‖ in determining that the Due Process Clause would be a vehicle
through which the Court would apply the Second Amendment against
the states.22
Yet, Justice Alito‘s opinion is not perfect. Most notably is the
misunderstanding of the Slaughter-House Cases.23 In its famous five to
four decision in the Slaughter-House Cases,24 a bare majority of the
Supreme Court, in dicta, gave a very narrow reading to the Fourteenth
Amendment.25 The issue before the Court was whether butchers could
be required to use a state-provided slaughter-house as a health measure
to prevent contamination of the drinking water of the City of New
Orleans. There is language in Justice Miller‘s opinion itself suggesting
that his discussion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is dicta.26 In
the opening portion of his opinion, Justice Miller wrote: ―[W]e now
propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the
construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to

18. See Patrick Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald:
“Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J.
CONST. L.& POL‘Y 7 (2011).
19. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
20. Id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. I have previously written a more thorough analysis in Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the
Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70
CHI-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom].
24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
25. Id. at 67. See Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23.
26. Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History and the
Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 111 (2009) [hereinafter Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of
Rights Against the States].
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the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither the
inclination nor the right to go.‖27
Justice Miller‘s opinion talks about being ―excused from defining
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . until
some case . . . may make it necessary to do so.‖28
Miller did not specifically speak to the issue of applying the Second
Amendment or any of the amendments to the states, but, in dicta, he
suggested a narrow reading for the Privileges and Immunities Clause.29
Nevertheless, Miller himself later approved moving away from his
narrow reading of the Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.30
What is odd about this is that there are other provisions of Miller‘s
opinion, which have been readily ignored. For example, Miller said in a
case, in which the plaintiffs were white butchers, that it would be hard to
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause would
ever apply to anyone except African Americans.31 As Dean John Norton
Pomeroy noted shortly after the decision, Miller‘s conclusion
―contradicts at once the meaning of the language and the facts of
history.‖32 Further, the legislative history demonstrates that the Equal
Protection Clause was also designed to protect white Unionists, from
both the South and the North, in their free speech and other rights in the
South.33 The courts have not been reluctant to ignore the privileges and
immunities dicta.34 No one today doubts that the Equal Protection
Clause applies to people of all races, not just African Americans.

27. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
28. Id. at 78 . Though this is speculation, one wonders whether an earlier draft stopped there
and it was the dissenting justices that prompted him to go further.
29. See RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 12 (2003) (―It might be
more accurate to view Miller‘s comments on privileges and immunities as dicta rather than doctrinal
holding.‖ (citation omitted)).
30. See id. at 248 n.51.
31. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80-82. See Pomeroy, infra note 32, at 565 (some
portions of the opinion ―seem[] to us utterly unnecessary to the decision of the case or to the main
argument upon which the decision is based . . . .‖ (omission added)).
32. JOHN NORTON Pomeroy, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BY THEODORE
SEDGWICK 564, (2d ed. 1874).
33. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 644-46 and especially 645
(―[T]he debates are replete with indications that the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to
protect Southern white Unionists, Northerners moving South, and aliens.‖ (footnote omitted)).
34. For example, just a few years later Judge Sawyer, in writing about the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated that because of the way the amendment was written, ―its benefits could not have
been intended to be limited to the [N]egro.‖ The R.R. Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 761 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)
(Sawyer, Circuit Judge, concurring).
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Similarly, one key part of the Court‘s dicta in Slaughter-House is
that the butchers did not have a federal (Fourteenth Amendment) right to
pursue the occupation of a butcher.35 Yet many subsequent decisions of
the Court have recognized among the individual‘s ―fundamental rights
which must be respected‖ the right ―to engage in any of the common
occupations of life . . . .‖36
This differing treatment of dicta on privileges and immunities and
what is more central to the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases with
respect to the race of the beneficiaries of the Equal Protection Clause
suggests that more is at work here than simply trying to follow Supreme
Court dicta. One has to wonder why this dicta of Slaughter-House was
not ignored with equal ease.
In a pre-McDonald essay, David Hardy suggested: ―There are
some things in the Bill of Rights that various Justices over the years
have just not liked, and it seems to me to be no more elegant than the
individual prejudices against said rights being put into practice whenever
possible.‖37
Of course, whatever one thinks of Slaughter-House, the
Cruikshank38 case clearly rejected the application of the Second

35. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872). Given the health considerations behind
the underlying legislation and the fact that the monopoly was not over who could be a butcher, but
rather where butchering could take place, it is more logical to believe this too was dicta. Michael
Ross has demonstrated that rather than creating a monopoly of who could be a butcher, the act in
question actually destroyed the monopoly of the Gascon butchers and opened the occupation up to
others, including African Americans. See MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS,
SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR Era (2003).
36. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the right to ―engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . .‖); Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Justice Marshall‘s dissenting opinion
in Roth indicating that ―liberty to work . . . is the ‗very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity‘ secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ Id. at 588-89. See also David H. Gans, The
Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 936 (2007) (―If an important aspect of
citizenship is the individual‘s freedom to shape his or her destiny in society, choices about the work
one performs daily should be protected as part of the freedom inherent in citizenship.‖ (citations
omitted)). In the context of Article IV, the Court has stated: ―Certainly, the pursuit of a common
calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges provided by the Clause . . . .‖ United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984).
37. David Hardy, Thoughts on the 14th Amendment Cases, (Feb. 23, 2009, 7:36 PM)
http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/2009/02/thoughts _on_the_5.php (last accessed July 31, 2010).
38. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). See generally, CHARLES LANE, THE
DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2008); NICHOLAS LEHMANN REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL
WAR (2006); and LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK
POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008). One would hope that if any
of the current Justices were to explore the facts of the Colfax Massacre, a battle fought in the name
of white supremacy, the Justices would condemn the Cruikshank case as a miscarriage of justice
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Amendment to the states. Yet, Cruikshank’s First Amendment views
had been rejected and overruled.39 What reason is there to think its
Second Amendment views are deserving of any more respect?
A further matter on which the Court could be criticized is focusing
upon the ―Due Process‖ Clause instead of considering Section 1 as a
whole. In his seminal dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,40
Justice Black refused to limit his analysis to the Due Process Clause, but
rather emphasized that he was in favor of finding the Bill of Rights
applied to the state based upon the entire content of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.41
III. JUSTICE THOMAS‘S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Thomas used the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a
vehicle through which to apply the Second Amendment against the
states.42 Justice Thomas termed this ―a more straightforward path‖ to
the enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states than that
adopted by the majority.43 This is probably the most faithful to the
intent of the framers and the people. As did Justice Alito, Justice
Thomas ignored the ―holistic‖ approach of using the entire section one
to reach the same result.44
There is such congruence between my scholarship and the
concurring opinion that it is rather like one is replicating a scientific
experiment and both times obtaining virtually the same result. The fact
that Justice Thomas‘s opinion is consistent with that of many scholars
looking at the same information is confirmation of its correctness.45 It
also makes it difficult for me to offer any critique of the opinion.
The one area in which Justice Thomas is in error is in his approach,
in dicta, to the application of the Establishment Clause to the states.46

instead of a precedent to be followed. It would be akin to citing Dred Scott or Plessy v. Ferguson,
not to document some historical fact, but because it was precedent and the Court chose to follow its
dicta or its decision.
39. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925)).
40. 332 U.S. 46, 68-93 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
41. Id.; See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 145 (2008); Gans, supra note 36.
42. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 3058.
44. See id. at 3058-88.
45. See e.g., AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 231-57
(1988).
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at n.20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In McDonald, Justice Thomas is willing to cite Kurt Lash‘s work
arguing for a narrow view of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause.47 But, as far as I can determine, even though Professor Lash
appears to be the only person who has made an in-depth analysis of the
Establishment Clause motivations of the Fourteenth Amendment
framers,48 Justice Thomas has not cited it in any of his written opinions
while on the Court.49
It is one thing to read Lash‘s
Establishment/Fourteenth Amendment work and reject it with reason
and citations. But it is something quite different to ignore the very work
of someone he cites as an authority.
Further, as far as I can determine, Justice Thomas has evidenced no
knowledge of the fact that several national churches split into northern
and southern branches when the southern members seceded in order to
maintain an ―established‖ church that would support slavery.50 Not
treating the national breakdown of the churches over the issues of
―establishing‖ slavery as part of the orthodoxy, it follows that Justice
Thomas did not discuss the breakup of individual churches over the
question of whether the Christian religion authorized slavery or not.51
Nor does Justice Thomas acknowledge in any of his opinions that the
slave-holding states used a ―licensing‖ system both before and during
Reconstruction to try to ensure that only the ―established view‖ of

47. Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L. J. 1241, 1256-57 (2010), cited in McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1995) (Southern establishment of
proslavery religion was one of the problems meant to be remedied by the Privileges or Immunities
clause). For a somewhat more detailed treatment of Lash‘s work in this area and the
interrelationship between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause, see Aynes, Ink Blot or
Not, supra at note *. See also, DANIEL W. STOWELL, REBUILDING ZION: THE RELIGIOUS
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTH, 1863-1877 (1998).
49. This is a result of a LEXIS search using the terms ―Thomas and Lash‖ conducted on
September 26, 2010.
50. For an account of this breach within the national Methodist Church, see GEORGE R.
CROOKS , THE LIFE OF BISHOP MATTHEW SIMPSON OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH (1891).
51. WILLIAM E. BARTELT, THERE I GREW UP: REMEMBERING ABRAHAM LINCOLN‘S
INDIANA YOUTH 12 (2008) (referencing the split over slavery of the South Fork Baptist Church in
Hardin County, Kentucky in 1816 and the Little Mount Baptist Church‘s ―clearly anti-slavery
stand‖ in Indiana). For an account of the division in churches in Mississippi before the Civil War,
see the autobiographical account of a Mississippi Unionist who escaped from a Mississippi prison,
[Rev] JOHN B. AUGHEY, THE IRON FURNACE: OR, SLAVERY AND SECESSION 247 (1863) (―The
Methodist Church South is expunging from the discipline everything inimical to the peculiar
institution . . . . The Church South refused to abide by the rules of the Church, and hence the guilt of
the schism lied with her,‖ noting that founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, ―regarded
[slavery] as the ‗sum of all villainy.‘‖).
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slavery and white supremacy was preached.52 This is one of the dangers
of dicta: Justice Thomas evidences no familiarity with this portion of
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment Clause
himself, and, by not waiting until a case which briefed those issues came
before the Court, he expressed an opinion that seems to be opposite of
what the facts would support.53
One can only hope that, notwithstanding his expressions in dicta
and his prior dissents, Justice Thomas will reserve his judgment until
after a case-in-controversy has raised this issue, the parties have briefed
the issue, the Court has heard oral argument, and he has examined the
record in the controversy of an actual case.
As for McDonald, with the exception of the dicta noted above,
Thomas‘s opinion, while it can and will no doubt be critiqued, presented
a reasonable view of the Amendment as contemplated by the people
proposing and ratifying the Amendment.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA‘S CONCURRING OPINION
Given the indications in Heller that were predictive of the result in
McDonald, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia joined Justice Alito‘s
opinion. Indeed, it would have been surprising if Scalia had repudiated
the Heller dicta so quickly after the opinion that he had authored. His
dissent adds little to the position articulated by Justice Alito. Instead, it
was written ―only to respond to some aspects of Justice Steven‘s
dissent.‖54 While Justice Steven‘s dissenting opinion and Justice
Scalia‘s concurring opinion make nice bookends for a discussion of their

52. Lash, supra note 48, at n.234.
53. For example, it would not be surprising if we were to learn that Justice Thomas has no
knowledge that as part of the efforts to establish a pro-slavery church, the Northern Methodist
Church was labeled by a convention in Bonham, Texas as ―[a] secret forces lurk[ing with] . . . the
manifest intention [was] . . . to do away with slavery‖ and, unlike the proslavery Southern
Methodist Church which was welcomed, the Northern Methodist Church was condemned. This
sentiment spread to include the state of Arkansas and by 1860 ―[a] number of the [Northern
Methodist] ministers and many lay members fled the State.‖ HISTORY OF BENTON, WASHINGTON,
CARROLL, MADISON, CRAWFORD, FRANKLIN, AND SEBASTIAN COUNTIES, ARKANSAS 786-87
(Goodspeed Pub. Co., Chicago, 1889). This is inconsistent with the many religious arguments made
against slavery. For example, William Jay (1789-1858), the son of Chief Justice John Jay, argued
that the southern laws prohibiting African Americans from reading or writing were ―tantamount to
prevent[ing] him from having a direct revelation of God.‖ CARTER G. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION
OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861: A HISTORY OF THE EDUCATION OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM THE BEGINNING OF SLAVERY TO THE CIVIL WAR 169 (1919).
54. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).

AYNES_CONLAW_6.21.11_FINAL FOR WEBSITE

2011]

MCDONALD V. CHICAGO

6/21/2011 6:17 PM

191

differing philosophies and the history of the Court, they add little to our
understanding of the Court‘s opinion or predicting its consequences.
However, in some ways Justice Scalia‘s opinion is the most
disappointing of the lot. In other cases and in other contexts, Justice
Scalia purports to be a respecter of history and tradition.55 Yet, we see
no evidence of those values here. Even if the usually outspoken Scalia
had a momentary need to be cautious, one would have expected him to
at least make some slight bow to the concurring opinion of his oft-ally,
Justice Thomas.56
V. THE DISSENTERS
Previously, I have suggested that the City of Chicago made a
tactical mistake in attempting to re-argue Heller.57 In such a situation,
the best tactical approach from the Respondent‘s side is to embrace
Heller, however reluctantly, and try to limit it to the applications to the
federal government.
Yet, such a view does not apply to the minority in Heller and
McDonald. They have the right and, perhaps, the duty to express their
views and it may be in time their dissents will be landmarks which guide
future decisions.
A.

Justice Stevens

Justice Stevens had a long and distinguished career on the Court.
McDonald is one of the last major decisions in which he participated.
Unfortunately, his ―swan song‖ failed to do justice to his career. This
Illinois Republican had established a reputation for both independence
and moderation.58 Whether affected by the intensity of the debate,
frustration over his inability to command a majority, the burden of too
many dissents that have yet to become law, or the effects of age and
health, the dissent is mostly a hodgepodge of personal beliefs and

55. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. For example, he might have said: ―Though there is much to commend in Justice Thomas‘
view, the current due process analysis suffices for the case before us and I will defer consideration
of the privileges and immunities clause until a more propitious moment.‖
57. Aynes, The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?, supra note 6. But see Mike Scarcella, Heller
II: The Sequel, NAT‘L L.J. 17, 18 (Oct. 25, 2010) (In litigation over Washington D.C.‘s post-Heller
legislation, Solicitor General Todd Kim of the D.C. Office of the U.S. Attorney General, who will
argue the case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C., said that: ―The District of Columbia fully
respects the Heller decision.‖).
58. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 836 (Kermit L. Hall et al eds., 1992).
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jurisprudential commentary without the force or weight one would
expect of a senior dissenting Justice.59 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens
makes an important point that apparently escaped the majority: ―[E]ven
if Heller had never been decided –indeed, even if the Second
Amendment did not exist—we would still have an obligation to address
the petitioner‘s Fourteenth Amendment claim.‖60
Yet he never really addresses that claim, which is ―more
compelling‖ under the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Second.61
Justice Stevens sounds very much like Justice Miller in the failed
Slaughter-House Cases, saying that ―the burden is severe for those to
seek radical change in such an established body of constitutional
doctrine.‖62 Over a hundred years ago, Justice Swayne answered Justice
Miller in sentences that should also be an admonishment to Justice
Stevens: ―It is objected to that the power conferred is novel and large.
The answer is that the novelty was known and the measure deliberately
adopted.‖63 Justice Stevens evidences no knowledge that Justices like
Swayne supported the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, while
Justice Miller, who he perhaps was unaware he was mimicking, and
others in the Slaughter-House majority opposed it.64
Justice Stevens gives only a passing nod to the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment.65 He cites no statements, speeches, or other
work of the framers or the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
takes no look at the legal treatises published between the proposal of the
Amendment and its ratification.66 The closest he comes is his citation to
the very weak 1965 work of Justice Frankfurter where Justice

59. Though there are no doubt different views of the opinion, my impression is consistent
with that expressed by David Hardy: ―In sum, the dissent bears the hallmark of a work that was
rushed through rather than thought out.‖ David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia
v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 68, available at
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HARDY_2010_61.pdf.
60. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3103 n.26 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Aynes, The Right to Bear Arms and the Right to Self-Defenses, supra note *, at 202.
62. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 129 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting).
64. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 660 & n.228.
65. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 and n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cites none
of the well-known Fourteenth Amendment scholars who have spent decades in studying the
Amendment who would support his view, such as Raoul Berger or Charles Fairman. This is,
perhaps, because their views have long since been discredited and this was demonstrated to the
Court in the Amicus Brief of Calguns, whose whole focus was upon scholars who had taken the
Fairman/Berger position.
66. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 83-94 (discussing treatises by
Justice Paschal, Dean Pomeroy, Judge Farrar, and Justice Cooley).
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Frankfurter attempts to do a one-sided survey of the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment.67
Stevens, born in 1920, ignores the first Justice Harlan (1833-1911),
Chief Justice Chase (1808-1873), Justice Swayne (1804-1884), and
others, but seems to have nostalgic feelings for the days of his youth
when Justice Harlan II (1899-1971) was on the Bench.68 He states that
he ―can hardly improve upon the many passionate defenses of this
position that Justice Harlan penned during his tenure on the Court.‖69
The fact that Justice Stevens is out of touch with both our history
and current views is shown by his reaction to the fact that a super
majority (31) of the states filed an amicus brief supporting McDonald:
―It is puzzling that so many state lawmakers have asked us to limit their
option to regulate a dangerous item.‖70
Part of the Respondent Chicago‘s argument before the Court was
that applying the Second Amendment to the state would spawn
litigation.71 This same theme was sounded in Justice Steven‘s dissenting
opinion72 and even in an editorial of the New York Times, referring to ―a
bog of lawsuits that could take many years to clear.‖73 This approach
may be superficially appealing, but it is logically flawed.
We have had the Constitution since 1787. Should we refrain from
enforcing the Constitution because it is too much trouble? The First
Amendment has been applied to the states since 1925,74 and yet we still
have suits about its meaning. One can understand the large amount of
litigation that raises questions on the Fourth Amendment right against
search and seizure and yet we still apply it. This is like saying that if we
did not have a right to jury trial, or a right to cross-examine witnesses
the state could more easily win its criminal cases. That may be true, but
it is not a reason to deny constitutional rights. The fact that people may
want to litigate the contours of the Second Amendment, as applied to the
states, is no reason to violate the Constitution and refuse to apply the
Amendment. There are some people who believe (wrongly I think) that
the First Amendment rights to free speech and free press should not be
applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. If someone
67. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 3093 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3115 n.47.
71. Brief for Respondent at 19-20, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL
5190478.
72. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Editorial, The Hard Work of Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at 7.
74. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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raised such an argument in litigation against the Times, one can be very
sure that the Times would not abandon those cases in order to protect
against future litigation.
One can respect Justice Stevens and yet be disappointed in the
quality of his opinion.
B.

Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Sotomayor

Justice Breyer‘s dissent is joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor. While he writes generally about history with respect to
Heller, there is no historical analysis with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is the issue before the Court.75 While Justice
Breyer‘s opinion cites sources concerning the Second Amendment, it
does not make any effort to determine what the framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended and cites no sources on that topic.76
Breyer claims that ―there is no reason here to believe that incorporation
of the private self-defense right will further any other or broader
constitutional objective.‖77 Further, Justice Breyer posits that ―the
private self-defense right does not significantly seek to protect
individuals who might otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment at
the hands of a majority.‖78 Members of ―a majority‖ or a minority might
well argue with that analysis. Surely, the right of self-defense is
designed to ―protect individuals who might otherwise suffer unfair or
inhumane treatment‖ by being robbed, shot, or murdered, whether the
denial was caused by a majority or a minority.
VI. THE FUTURE?
There are many unanswered questions about how Heller and
McDonald will be applied to future cases. Among those, Lyle
Denniston, summarizing Justice Breyer‘s dissent in McDonald, has
listed nineteen unanswered questions in a blog for SCOTUS.79
As Professor Randy Barnett wrote, the First Amendment
jurisprudence did not all come at once, but rather developed over time.80
75. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3120-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 3125.
78. Id.
79. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Gun Rights Go National, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2010, 5:09
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/analysis-gun-rights-go-national.
80. E-mail from Randy Barnett, to Richard L. Aynes, (Aug. 25, 2009) (on file with author)
(―The complexity of First Amendment doctrine took decades to develop case by case in response to
different problems arising in different contexts. There is no reason to doubt that, if the courts take a
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He suggested the same would be true of the Second Amendment postHeller cases.81 I am not troubled by the Court moving slowly and
developing these tests over time. Indeed, had the majority moved more
quickly, they would have been criticized for dicta and even for deciding
matters in which there was no case in controversy. It is a worthy project
for one to try to fill in some of the blank spaces and help the courts
decide what they can and cannot uphold in the future.
Yet, some of the issues to be faced stemmed from the Court‘s
insistence on deriving a right to self-defense from the Second
Amendment right to bear arms. The right of self-defense applies to
people who do not use weapons and could easily be recognized under
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Article
IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause,82 or as a right reserved to the people
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Patrick Charles has suggested that we focus upon history, using, in
part, English practices.83 At the same time, how do we tell what English
practices to use and which not to use? For example, we know that in the
First Amendment area, English freedom of speech was largely restricted
to prior restraint,84 but our First Amendment was not;85 we know that
English practice allowed writs of assistance for general warrants,86 but
our Fourth Amendment does not;87 the early American treatises
distinguish part of Blackstone‘s treatise as inapplicable to the U.S.
because sovereignty was in the Crown in England and in the people in
the U.S.88 This history tells us we cannot import English practice
wholesale. Does one need to acknowledge that and then provide some
―test‖ on how we know what to use?
right to keep and bear arms just as seriously as they do the freedom of speech they will not
eventually develop the same sort of nuanced doctrines that take account of the difference between
speech and weapons.‖). See also Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 314 (1825) (drawing
an analogy between the First and the Second Amendments and indicating that both could be
punished for abuses, such a libel).
81. E-mail from Randy Barnett, to Richard L. Aynes, supra note 80.
82. E.g., State v. Hardy, 60 Ohio App.2d 325, 397 N.E.2d 773 (1978) (if the State were to
order someone to die rather than act in self-defense, that would be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
83. See Charles, supra note 18.
84. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.3(c)
(4th ed. 2008).
85. Id.
86. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 66 (1998).
87. Id.
88. See Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1
(2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Enumerated Rights?].
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McDonald promises to be one of the standard cases studied by
lawyers.89 Jon Roland of the Constitution Society has referred to it as a
―landmark‖ decision.90
What the majority and the dissent seem to have in common is the
extent to which the Justices are ―Court-centric.‖ None of them have
ever played a major role in the legislative process—such as Justice
Black—nor in the executive branch—such as Justice Douglas. They all
seem overly concerned about what the Court has done (precedent) rather
than what the Constitution requires.
There is a second aspect of this argument. The unresolved
questions pointed out by several academics, the dissent, and Lyle
Denniston all go to the fact that the Court is not a legislature. Yes, if this
were the Chicago City Council one would expect a full, detailed
explanation of the legislation and where we go from here. But it is not.
It is a Court charged with deciding the case before it, not with creating
dicta without the benefit of a concrete case before it or without the
benefit of briefing by opposing sides.
The New York Times whimpers: ―[The Court] provided very little
guidance as to what is reasonable, leaving lawmakers and judges to
thrash it out. . .‖91 No, like everyone else, the Times will have to wait for
a tangible case that presents real issues for the Court to consider after
two disputing parties have done their best to brief both sides of the issue.
This is how the Court works – not like the editorial pages of a
newspaper.
Just four days after the McDonald decision, the Chicago City
Council passed, 45-0, a set of new gun regulations that can only be

89. The supplements to Constitutional Law casebooks include excerpts from McDonald, as
well as its rival for attention for this term, Citizens United. See, e.g., CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2010 SUPPLEMENT 30-38 (McDonald) and 74-92 (Citizens United);JEROME
A. BARRON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS, SEVENTH
EDITION, 2010 SUPPLEMENT 84-104 (McDonald) and 228-46 (Citizens United); WILLIAM D.
ARAIZA, PHOEBE A. HADDON, DOROTHY E. ROBERTS & M. ISABEL MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES, THIRD EDITION, 2010 SUPPLEMENT 35-68 (McDonald)
and 179-91 (Citizens United); and DOUGLASS W. KMIEC, STEPHEN PRESSER, JOHN C. EASTMAN &
RAYMOND B. MARCIN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES AND
PHILOSOPHY; THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION;
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, THIRD EDITION, COMBINED 2010
SUPPLEMENT v (referring to McDonald as ―highly controversial and jurisprudentially fascinating‖),
vi (noting that Citizens United was the case President Obama discussed in his State of the Union
message and to which Justice Alito mouthed the words ―Not true.‖), 1-53 (McDonald) and 137-66
(Citizens United).
90. E-mail posted to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu on June 28, 2010.
91. The Hard Work of Gun Control, supra note 73.
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designed to create another round of litigation.92 Having just lost its case,
Chicago enacted what the Chicago Sun-Times calls the ordinance the
―most restricted in the nation‖ and neither Mayor Dailey nor Maria
Georges disputed the claim.93 To its credit, the Times recognized the
confrontational nature of the ordinance, noting, perhaps diplomatically,
that it ―edged right up to the line drawn by the court.‖94 But the Times
never acknowledge that it was Chicago‘s extreme ordinance in the first
place that prompted the initial litigation and that it is Chicago‘s ―in your
face‖ extremism that prompts a new round of litigation.
The Times believes the fault here lies with ―the gun lobby‖ and not
with the people who provide the opportunity to win cases by extreme
ordinances.95 Yet, though it may be sent in code, the editorial of the
Times actually ends in good advice and a somewhat hidden rebuke to the
Chicago City Council: ―Lawmakers need not match the [gun] lobby‘s
obduracy. Cities and states should counter with tough but sensible laws
designed to resist legal challenges . . . .‖96
Ordinances that go to what legislators think is ―the edge‖ are
unlikely to do this.97 Statements attributed to Mayor Dailey, if true,
make it clear that he thinks of this as a policy issue rather than
constitutional issue: ―[The Justices] don‘t seem to appreciate the full
scope of gun violence in America.‖98 One could just as easily say that
Mayor Daley does not appreciate the constraints of the Constitution.
There is no question that cities like Chicago and D.C. have very
serious challenges with crime.99 One way of looking at this is that
92. The very minimal time, itself, shows that no serious attention was given to the issue by the
Council. The Court‘s opinion itself is over 120 pages. It takes a full ½ day to read the full opinion
with any degree of seriousness. To contemplate a proper response would take more than four days.
The rush to pass the ordinance and the vituperative language used by the City Council shows a lack
of seriousness. The City Council was obviously quite willing to spend taxpayer money in litigation.
It would have been money better spent on convening a group of experts to help them establish
ordinances that comply with the Court‘s decisions or putting more police officers on the streets.
93. Abdon M. Pallasch, Chicago Approves New Gun Restrictions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4,
2010.
94. Since the Times editorial writings ―strongly disagreed‖ with McDonald, it is not clear that
they could accurately assess what was the ―edge‖ of the Court‘s holding. Reading McDonald with
the proverbial ―jaundiced eye‖, they are likely to read the holding as more restrictive than it actually
is. The Hard Work of Gun Control, supra note 73.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Steve Chapman, Defenseless in Chicago, or the Flaws in Gun Control, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, reprinted in AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 2, 2010, at A-7. (describing mainly the
different views on the effectiveness of handgun registration).
99. The Amicus Brief of the Rutherford Institute in McDonald indicates that in 2008, Chicago
experienced 412 homicides and 92% of them occurred in a home. Brief for Rutherford Institute as
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Chicago wants to solve its problems in the cheapest way possible: by
violating the Constitution rather than by providing more police
protection, increasing high school and college graduation rates,
providing good jobs for its people, and other related matters.
This past gun ban obviously did not work in preventing homicides.
Whether it contained a problem that could have been worse or not is a
matter over which criminologists argue. But it is like saying we would
have more safety if there was no protection against searches and seizures
and police could wiretap at will, or if the burden of proof was on the
defendant to prove his/her innocence.
VII. THE MARKS RULE
Patrick Charles and others have been concerned about the Marks
question and whether the plurality of four Justice opinions was the
―narrowest‖ which would control or whether Justice Thomas‘s
concurring opinion would control.100 Some have concluded that the
Alito plurality rejected Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion.101
However, as Randy Barnett emphasized, the plurality never denied
that Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion was correct.102 Rather, the
plurality simply indicated that it was not necessary to decide the case to
reach the question of the approach taken by Justice Thomas.103 For
example, Justice Scalia, in talking about his own misgivings over the
concept of substantive due process and the Court‘s precedent, indicates:
―This case does not require me to consider that view, since
straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.‖104
Standards of Review
One of the unanswered questions that apparently cause people the
most anguish is: what will the standard of review be?105
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)
(No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4030385.
100. See Charles, supra note 18.
101. Cohen & Stearns, supra note 13 at 35.
102. Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the Challenge to Economic Mandates,
supra note 5.
103. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3085-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. See Lawrence B. Solum, Charles on McDonald v. City of Chicago & the Standard of
Review, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/08/Charles-on-mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago-thestandard-of-review.html. See also Eugene Volokh, What Burden of Proof Is Constitutionally
Required for Denying Gun Rights to the Allegedly Dangerous and Mentally Infirm?, THE VOLOKH
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Patrick Charles, who has authored many works on the Second
Amendment, opposed the decision in Heller and then opposed its
extension in McDonald, arguing, in part, that the Fourteenth Amendment
framers only intended to protect a right to serve in the militia.106 Charles
has an impressive knowledge of the pre-Constitutional English practices
and early Americans ones. Wittingly or unwittingly, he takes a position
essentially taken by those who argue that the Due Process and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses were designed to protect only equality against
discrimination.
As Randy Barnett has noted, at one time the draft Fourteenth
Amendment, while pending in the Joint Committee of Reconstruction,
contained both a non-discrimination provision and the current
Fourteenth Amendment, strongly suggesting that the two were
different.107 Further, the Equal Protection Clause does that job quite
nicely and if that were the only goal of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, it would be superfluous.
Rather, it has long been established that the protection was not
designed for the militia.108 During the debates over the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, Sidney Clarke (R-Kansas) asked: Who were to be protected by
the Act? His answer was:
Not the present militia; but the brave black soldiers of the Union,
disarmed and robbed by this wicked despotic order. Nearly every
white man in [Mississippi] that could bear arms was in the rebel ranks.
Nearly all of their able-bodied [Black] men who could reach our lines
enlisted under the old flag. Many of these brave defenders of the
nation paid for their arms with which they went to battle . . . . [T]he
―reconstructed‖ state authorities of Mississippi were allowed to rob
and disarm our veteran soldiers and arm the rebels fresh from the field
of treasonable strife.
Sir, the disarmed loyalist of Alabama,

CONSPIRACY (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:33 PM) http://volokh.com/2010/10/08/what-burden-of-proof-isconstitutionally-required-for-denying-gun-rights-to-the-allegedly-mentally-infirm/ (last visited Oct.
12, 2010).
106. Solum, supra note 112. See also Charles, supra note 18.
107. Randy Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, (J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS, vol. 3, no. 1(forthcoming) (Georgetown Public Law, Research
Paper No. 10-06), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538862 [hereinafter Barnett, Whence
Comes Section One?]. Charles‘ focus is upon whether the right applies to all persons or only
citizens. On that issue, he may be correct: Marks may require that McDonald be read to only apply
to citizens. Yet this does not preclude a majority of a future Court from accepting the view of the
McDonald plurality over the vote of Justice Thomas as a single Justice on other issues.
108. Robert J. Cottrol, Structure, Participation, Citizenship, and Right: Lessons from Akhil
Amar’s Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 87 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2322 (1999) (book review).
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Mississippi, and Louisiana are powerless to-day, and oppressed by the
pardoned and encouraged rebels of those States.109

Other unresolved issues involve the use of non-lethal weapons.110 I
would suggest that another issue is whether self-defense without a gun is
protected under the Constitution. By deriving the right to self-defense
from the Second Amendment, the Court majority seems to have
carefully linked to the use of a weapon that fires bullets.111 But may an
unarmed person not fight back when attacked by someone? May a
carpenter who is threatened by a person with a knife not pick up his
hammer to act in self-defense?
It has long been illegal for convicted felons to possess and use
weapons.112 This seems to support the Heller and McDonald majority
dicta that convicted felons may, if the state chooses, not possess arms.113
Don Kates, a long-time advocate of the Second Amendment protection
of the rights of gun owners, writes: ―Everyone except perhaps the most
extreme libertarians generally agrees with prohibiting possession of
firearms by convicted felons, violent misdemeanants and the mentally
unbalanced—as our laws currently do.‖114
However, what happens when an unarmed convicted felon is
attacked by someone with arms? May the felon not take the weapon
away for the attacker and use it on a second attacker who is armed? If
the convicted felon knows the location of a weapon controlled by a third
party, is a convicted felon to die rather than retrieving third-party‘s
weapon and using it in self defense?115 But then how does one
determine who owned the weapon and what is a pretext for the convicted
felon owning a weapon?116

109. Id. at 2323 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
110. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1387 (2009); Paul H. Robinson, Op-Ed., Shoot to Stun, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/opinion/02robinson.html, and Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal SelfDefense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 (2009).
111. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
113. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570).
114. Don B. Kates, The Right to Arms: The Criminology of Guns 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 86 (2010). Kates also states that all societies have limited arms to ―trustworthy‖ people,
which does not include serious felons. In the eighteenth century, Kates indicates, the felons were
―civilly dead‖ and were not considered part of ―the people.‖ Id. at 97.
115. See State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. Ct. 1978).
116. See State v. Smead, 9th Dist. C. A. No. 24903, 2010-Ohio-4462 (D. Ohio), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/9/2010/2010-ohio-4462.pdf.
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What about the claim that a convicted felon or one unlicensed to
have a gun, found a loaded gun in his yard, at a playground, or other
dangerous place when he came home and for safety reasons, picked it
up, intending to turn it into the police the next day?117
There are some older cases that suggest that the Second
Amendment protects the right to have arms by ―the whole people, old
and young, men, women, and boys . . . .‖118 On the other hand, the First
Circuit recently upheld a federal statute that makes it a crime for a minor
to have a handgun.119
While there are many unanswered questions, there are also
solutions. Professor Adam Winkler noted in December of 2009, that
there had been 150 post-Heller challenges in federal courts to federal
gun controversy over the course of a year.120 ―Not one law has been
invalidated for violation of the Second Amendment since Heller.‖121
Similarly, Eugene Volokh notes that forty-four of the fifty states have
state constitutional provisions that ―expressly secure a right to keep and
bear arms‖ and ―at least 40 of them clearly protect and individual right,
aimed partly at self-defense.‖122 ―Yet state courts interpreting those
provisions have upheld the great majority of all modest gun controls that
they have considered.‖123
Even Dennis Henigan of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence
believes that ―the national experience with the Brady Act, which
mandates a background check on persons buying guns from licensed
dealers, also suggests that even fairly modest gun restrictions can reduce
the use of guns in crime.‖124 He quotes, with apparent approval,
considerations of such steps as ―blocking gun sales to persons on the
terrorist watch list, requiring gun owners to report lost and stolen guns,

117. See Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323 (D.C. 2009).
118. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (emphasis added).
119. United States v. Rene, 583 F.3d 8, (1st Cir. 2009). See also State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash.2d
276, 225 P.3d 995 ( 2010) (the statute does have multiple exceptions for underage use).
120. Heller Requires Scrutiny of Federal Ban on Guns Possession by Domestic Abusers, 78
U.S.L.W. 1313 (Dec. 1, 2009). But see, United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (rev’d and remanded) (holding that a federal statute which makes it a crime to possess a
firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order violates the second amendment). On
the other hand, see United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (involving the ban on
felons possessing guns).
121. Adam Winkler, Heller‘s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551,1566 (2009).
122. Eugene Volokh, States’ Rights vs. Gun Rights (Mar. 2, 2010, 7:17 PM)
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/states-rights-vs-=gun-rights.?hp (last visited
July 3, 2010).
123. Id.
124. Henigan, supra note 9, at 334 (citing statistics to support the claim).
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and providing more crime data to local police.‖125 Further, he
acknowledges that ―there are many strategies for fighting crime and
violence not involving gun control that should be explored and
implemented . . .‖126 Henigan quotes, with apparent approval, Professor
Tushnet‘s pre-Heller suggestions that what is needed is ―more police on
the streets, ensuring that young people have better access to education
and job, more disparagement by leading public figures of violence on
television and in movies, or whatever else serious inquiry into the cause
of crime and violence reveals to be somewhat effective policies.‖127
Kates, based on travels in Europe, suggests that police might be
dispatched in teams and not sent out for tasks as single, unsupported
officers and that banks follow a European design that makes them more
difficult to rob.128
One of the concerns about the deregulation of guns is their potential
use for the unauthorized use by minors and accidents in the home. But
there are solutions. For example, at this year‘s Heritage Festival in
Kent, Ohio, the Police Department handed out 200 free firearms safety
kits, which each included a gun lock.129 Similarly, as I have previously
noted, there is now on the market a ―biometric safe‖ in which one could
store a handgun and yet have ready access because it opens upon
verification of a fingerprint.
There is, of course, the large question of whether Heller and
McDonald are limited to the right to have guns in the home 130 or which
of those cases or their later progeny will extend the right to areas outside
of the home remains to be seen.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though the changes worked by McDonald are slight when viewed
from a national prospective, they hold open a variety of issues upon
which large steps can be taken. As set forth above, there are a variety of
issues which will have to be addressed and their resolution may affect
the future of the people of each state and of the nation.

125. Id. at 336. It is unclear what additional data he thinks should be reported to police.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 335.
128. Kates, supra note 114, at 96.
129. Gun Locks, AKRON BEACON J., June, 28 2010.
130. Professor Darrell A. H. Miller, for example, has argued that the regulatory regime for
guns should be analogous to that of pornography, allowing use in the home but not outside of it.
Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1278 (2009).
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People who view themselves as conservatives may well have to
resolve the conflict between less gun regulations and the payment of
more taxes for the containment or reduction of crime.
We would expect there would be normal interpretive matters with
the meaning of the decision and that reasonable people may disagree.
But there are also individuals of both points of view who may go beyond
the pale of reason. On the one hand, one thinks of the protester who
brought an AK-47 to a rally in Arizona131 or the litigant who wanted to
be able to take a handgun into the public area of the Atlanta Airport.132
On the other hand, one sees actions by people like the Council
people of Chicago, who, having lost in the McDonald, defiantly pass
regulations that they know or should know cannot be sustained in
court.133 Of more concern is that the strategy adopted by opponents of
Roe v. Wade134 will be adopted and opponents will try to use regulations,
taxes, and other methods of making reasonable gun ownership as
difficult as possible.
Where this will all end, no one can tell. But it will depend upon the
common sense of the American people to insure that only reasonable
legislation (even if debatable) is passed and the common sense of the
courts to insure that a reasonably robust right to bear arms survives the
attacks made upon by their opponents and can exist in fact, as well as
theory.

131. See Rick Sanchez, Guns at a Presidential Event? (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/18/obama.protest.rifle/index.html?iref=allsearch#cnnSTC
Video.
132. Shannon McCaffrey, Lawsuit Filed Over Atlanta Airport Barring Guns, YAHOO! NEWS
(July
1,
2008,
2:04
PM),
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap_travel/20080701/ap_tr_ge/travel_brief_airport_guns.
133. See Pallasch, supra note 93.
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

